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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, machine learning based Automatic Speech Recognition
(ASR) technique has widely spread in smartphones, home devices,
and public facilities. As convenient as this technology can be,
a considerable security issue also raises – the users’ speech con-
tent might be exposed to malicious ASR monitoring and cause se-
vere privacy leakage. In this work, we propose HASP – a high-
performance security enhancement approach to solve this security
issue on mobile devices. Leveraging ASR systems’ vulnerability
to the adversarial examples, HASP is designed to cast human im-
perceptible adversarial noises to real-time speech and effectively
perturb malicious ASR monitoring by increasing the Word Error
Rate (WER). To enhance the practical performance on mobile de-
vices, HASP is also optimized for effective adaptation to the human
speech characteristics, environmental noises, and mobile computa-
tion scenarios. The experiments show that HASP can achieve opti-
mal real-time security enhancement: it can lead an average WER of
84.55% for perturbing the malicious ASR monitoring, and the data
processing speed is 15×∼ 40× faster compared to the state-of-the-
art methods. Moreover, HASP can effectively perturb various ASR
systems, demonstrating a strong transferability.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent progress in the artificial intelligence especially the ma-
chine learning technology is reshaping our life in various aspects.
The most representative example is the Automatic Speech Recog-
nition (ASR). Enhanced by deep learning models, ASR now can
achieve the recognition performance as accurate as human percep-
tion. Therefore ASR has been maturely applied to embedded voice
assistant [1, 2] and various online voice services [3, 4].
Although this technology offers great convenience, a consider-
able security issue also raises. Since ASR widely spreads in smart-
phones, home devices, and public facilities [1,2], the users’ speech
content might be exposed to malicious ASR monitoring and cause
severe privacy leakage [5]. As reported in [6], some ASR equipped
smart home devices might monitor the users’ daily conversation for
activity analysis. Also, [7] shows that the malicious ASR monitor-
ing can be used to extract the users’ voice command biometrics and
defraud the mobile voice authentication. As ASR’s data processing
bandwidth, precision, and application popularity keep involving,
the security issue of malicious ASR monitoring also becomes more
and more severe.
Although malicious ASR monitoring could cause considerable
privacy leakage, the machine learning based ASR itself also has
significant vulnerability, especially to the ”adversarial examples” [8].
The ASR adversarial examples here can be referred to the speech
data with adversarial noises injected [9]. The adversarial noises
could perturb ASR systems and even manipulate the recognition re-
sults by increasing the Word Error Rate (WER). While, the speech
content with adversarial noises still sounds the same to the human
perception [9, 10]. Therefore, many works are also proposed to
manipulate the speech data to defect the ASR: In [9], Carlini et
al. injected adversarial noises to a speech data with less than 0.1%
waveform difference. Such a speech data can mislead ASR to any
desired results. In [11], Cisse et al. also crafted a speech adver-
sarial example, and this example can effectively disturb multiple
ASR systems. Although, such a vulnerability would significantly
defect the desired ASR functionality, it can be also well utilized for
preventing malicious ASR monitoring [10].
In this work, we propose HASP – a high-performance adaptive
security enhancement solution, targeting malicious ASR monitor-
ing on mobile devices. Working locally on the mobile device,
HASP is expected to utilize the adversarial example method to in-
ject adversarial noises directly on raw user speech data collected
from the microphone. Hence, before the speech data is released to
local or online third party applications, the user can use HASP to
encrypt their speech content preventing malicious ASR monitoring.
As many adversarial example based ASR perturbation works still
remained in theoretical evaluation, we take several practical chal-
lenges into consideration to design and implement HASP: (1) The
proposed ASR perturbation method should meet the real-time re-
quirement with fast processing speed. (2) It should balance the ad-
versarial noise impact and human perception quality. (3) It should
adapt to practical applications, regarding the external environment
and internal system factors, such as computation resources and
ASR model variance.
To tackle these challenges, we made the following contributions:
• We first proposed a fast ASR perturbation method targeting
the speech transformation stage with Mel-frequency Cepstral
Coefficients (MFCCs). Adversarial noises are derived from
MFCC feature vectors and injected to the speech data to per-
turb malicious ASR monitoring.
• We further optimized the perturbation method to reduce the
adversarial noises’ impact to human perception quality, while
the perturbation effectiveness is well maintained.
• We also enhanced the adaptability of HASP, regarding the
environmental noises, mobile computation scenarios, and ASR
model variation.
• We implemented the proposed HASP as a system component
on Android smartphones, and further evaluated the real-time
performance in practical utilization scenarios.
Experimental results show that: the proposed MFCC based ASR
perturbation method of HASP could achieve an average WER of
84.5% to the most representative ASR model (i.e. DeepSpeech
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Figure 1: Typical ASR Processing Flow with Different Models
[12]). The speech quality oriented optimization of HASP can fur-
ther reduce the human-perceptible adversarial noises by 42%. Com-
paring to the state-of-the-art ASR perturbation methods, HASP could
achieve 40× faster data processing speed to fulfill the real-time
processing requirement. Regarding the adaptability, HASP can be
well deployed with environmental noises as loud as 81dB, and sup-
port different application scenarios’ in real-time. Moreover, by
evaluating HASP with multiple state-of-the-art ASR systems (i.e.
Google Speech Recognition [4], Microsoft Bing Voice Recogni-
tion [3], etc.), HASP also demonstrates significant model transfer-
ability with WER from 51% to 77%, which indicates strong capa-
bility to handle potential unknown ASR systems.
2. PRELIMINARY
In this section, the technical preliminaries are presented to facili-
tate our design. Firstly, we investigate the ASR processing flow and
the significance of the fundamental MFCC process. Then, we brief
the state-of-art ASR perturbation works. Last but not least, we re-
view the speech processing flow on mobile devices to illustrate the
malicious ASR monitoring and possible defense strategy.
2.1 Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR)
ASR allows machines to recognize and convert human speech
content to text automatically [13]. As shown in Fig. 1, different
ASR systems generally utilize 4 major stages to process the speech
data from speech waveform to sentence text [14]: The framed speech
waveform is firstly converted to MFCC feature vectors with certain
frequency patterns; Then, the MFCC feature vectors are recognized
by the acoustic models as phonemes with the highest probability,
and the combined phonemes are used to estimate potential letter
sequence; Specific dictionary models are also used to correct the
word spelling of the phoneme letter sequence; At last, the words
are further adjusted to the contexts and merged to the final sentence
text by language models.
Through ASR processing, various models are utilized in each
stage. For acoustic feature recognition, as the features are pro-
cessed with certain correlations, temporal models are well utilized
in addition to further feature extraction, e.g. Hidden Markov Mod-
els with Deep Neural Network (DNN+HMMs) [15]. Recently, ad-
vanced integrated models also emerged targeting multiple stages,
e.g. Recurrent Neural Network with Connectionist Temporal Clas-
sification (RNN+CTC) [16] and Attention-based ASR model [17].
Although various models present in ASR systems, MFCC pro-
cess is constantly adopted in the first feature extraction stage re-
gardless of ASR system variance [18]. MFCC process transforms
the speech waveform to feature vectors composed of a set of short-
term power spectrum coefficients, which collectively make up a
Mel-Frequency Cepstrum (MFC) [19]. As MFC approximates the
human auditory system’s response more closely than other linear
cepstrum methods, MFCC feature vector is considered the most
suitable frequency transformation format for speech data. Compar-
ing to other models in ASR systems, MFCC process not only lays
the most primary and intrinsic feature foundation for ASR process-
ing, but also has much less computation overhead.
Considering the significance of MFCC process, we assume that
perturbing the MFCC feature vectors could cause more influen-
tial impact to the whole ASR system with better computation ef-
ficiency. In later sections, we further demonstrate the mechanism
of MFCC process and propose our ASR perturbation method based
on the manipulation of MFCC feature vectors.
2.2 ASRPerturbation with Adversarial Examples
Recently, inspired by the adversarial attacks to the neural net-
works for image recognition [8], many works have been proposed
to apply adversarial examples to perturb the ASR process [9,20,21].
The ASR adversarial examples are crafted by injecting adversarial
noises to the speech data, which can effectively fool the ASR sys-
tem but still sound the same to human perception [9].
In [20], Alzantot et al. crafted several voice commands with
trivial background adversarial noises, which were generated with
genetic algorithm. Although the crafted adversarial noises can ef-
fectively mislead ASR to totally different meanings, the generation
method can be applied only to specific short voice command with
small perturbation scope. In [10], Yuan et al. embedded the voice
commands into songs stealthily as adversarial noises to activate
specific ASR systems. Although they investigated the transferabil-
ity of the adversarial noises to various ASR systems, their method
was only transferable to two different systems at most. Meanwhile,
their method was realized at a considerable cost of computation
overhead, which significantly compromised the practical applica-
tion. In [21], Gong et al. crafted adversarial noises that can manip-
ulate ASR to desired results. Although highly effective, the gener-
ation process also took extremely long computation time.
These works have demonstrated ASR’s significant vulnerability
to the adversarial examples, which can be well utilized to prevent
malicious ASR monitoring. However, most of the ASR perturba-
tion works still suffer from obvious issues, such as perturbation
scope, model transferability, and computation overhead. In this
work, our proposed method is expected to have universal effec-
tiveness regardless of ASR model variance and optimal processing
speed with low computation overhead.
2.3 ASR on Mobile System
Fig. 2 briefly illustrates the speech processing flow on an An-
droid mobile system [22]. After being collected and amplified by
microphone, the speech data is further sampled, quantized, and en-
coded by on-board hardware components, such as Analog/Digital
(A/D) Converter and Digital Signal Processor (DSP). The hardware
components are controlled by several software classes provided by
Android system, such as AudioRecorder and MediaRecorder [23].
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Figure 2: ASR Process Perturbation on Mobile System
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The processed speech data is then stored at specific memory space
designated by the system before releasing to local applications or
online services for further utilization. However, malicious ASR is
usually embedded in those applications and services. As long as the
audio authority is granted to these embedded targets by the Android
system, malicious ASR can easily monitor the speech content.
In that case, we propose a security enhancement middle-ware
before the speech data storage in the memory space. This middle-
ware can leverage ASR’s vulnerability to adversarial examples, and
inject adversarial noises to the raw speech data before exposed to
malicious ASR monitoring. The users can also use the enhanced
mobile device as a voice changer to interact with other ASR em-
bedded devices for better security.
In the following sections, we will dive into the design details.
3. ASR PERTURBATION BASED ON
ADVERSARIAL MFCC NOISE
In the last section, we introduced the significance of the funda-
mental MFCC process, which is an efficient and effective manip-
ulation target for perturbing malicious ASR monitoring. In this
section, we will further investigate MFCC process mechanism and
propose an ASR perturbation method based on the adversarial ex-
amples derived from the MFCC feature vectors.
3.1 MFCC Process Analysis
MFCC process transforms an speech waveform into feature vec-
tors composed of coefficients of Mel-Frequency Cepstrum. Such a
process usually contains 6 steps. Major steps and the corresponding
outputs are demonstrated in Fig. 3:
1. Pre-emphasize. Before MFCC process, assuming an input
speech waveform x is pre-processed by sampling and quantization,
it is firstly transformed into a speech vector xs in time domain,
where s indicates the sth sampling point [24].
The pre-emphaize process is used to balance the frequency spec-
trum of xs, especially on the weak high-frequency domain that
needs amplification. To achieve the spectrum balance, the pre-
emphasis filter can be applied to xs with the following equation:
PEM : ypres = xs − αxs−1, (1)
where α is the filter coefficient (∼0.97), and ypres is the balanced
speech vector after the pre-emphasis process.
2. Framing. The pre-emphasized ypres needs to be partitioned
into multiple vector frames, since Fourier-transform can’t be ap-
plied across the entire speech without continuous frequency con-
tour loss through time domain [25]. In Fourier transform of speech,
frequencies are assumed to be relatively stationary in a very short
time frame. Therefore, by applying the Fourier transform to each
frame, we can obtain a good approximation of the frequency con-
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Figure 3: MFCC Process Analysis with Spectrum Examples
tours, and the entire audio can be presented by concatenating adja-
cent frames together. The frame size is usually set as 20ms∼40ms,
and 50% overlap is reserved between consecutive vector frames [25].
After the framing process, the speech vector is converted into a
vector frame array, where the mth point in the nth vector frame is
represented as yfra(m,n).
3. Windowing. As certain overlap present between vector frames,
the vector frames can’t be well aligned with smooth connection,
which may lead to considerable frequency leakage in frequency do-
main. To precisely align the vector frames, a hamming-windowing
function is to polish each signal point yfra(m,n) to y
win
(m,n) [26]:
WIN : ywin(m,n) =
{
0.54− 0.46cos( 2pi(n− 1)
Nfra − 1 )
}
× yfra
(m,n)
, (2)
where Nfra means the windowing length in each frame.
4. Fast Fourier-Transforming (FFT). Since it is difficult to ex-
tract features from the speech vectors in time domain, FFT is widely
utilized to transfer the speech vectors into frequency domain and
derive their power spectrums [27].
To achieve frequency domain transformation of ywin(m,n), we first
apply NFFT -point FFT to each vector frame:
FFT : yFFT(k,n) =
NFFT∑
n=1
ywin(m,n)e
−j2pikn/NFFT , 1 ≤ k ≤ K, (3)
where yFFT(k,n) is the frequency spectrum of the nth vector frame,
and k means the kth frequency point from K points in total.
In frequency domain, yFFT(k,n) is further transformed to power spec-
trum for feature extraction:
yFFT(k,n) =
1
NFFT
|yFFT(k,n)
2|. (4)
As shown in in Fig. 3, the power spectrum distributions demon-
strate obvious frequency patterns.
5. Mel-Filter Banking. In MFCC process, Mel-Filter Banking
process is adopted to highlight the frequency patterns regarding hu-
man perception preference [24]. It is composed of a set of L filters
(L =13∼26), which are more discriminative to low frequencies but
less discriminative to higher ones. By applying Mel-Filter Bank of
MB(f1, f2, ..., fL), a Mel-power spectrum yMelln can be derived as:
MFB : yMel(l,n) = P
FFT
kn ×MB(f1, f2, ..., fL), 1 ≤ l ≤ L, (5)
where l is the lth point in the nth frame, and L also indicates the
total point number in each frame after Mel-Filter Banking process.
As shown in Fig. 3, although Mel-power spectrum has less res-
olution than the original power spectrum, its feature complexity in
the low frequency domain is well enhanced.
6. Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). Mel-power spectrum usu-
ally has highly correlation inside, which could be problematic for
machine learning algorithms. Hence, to accommodate later ma-
chine learnig models in ASR, dedicated DCT process is applied to
decorrelate the yMel(l,n):
DCT : yDCT(l,n) = y
Mel
ln cos[(l − 0.5)pil
L
]. (6)
As the MFC patterns in Fig. 3 become more granular, the effec-
tiveness of such a decorrelation process can be well observed.
With the aforementioned 6 steps, MFCC process transforms a
speech waveform xs to a set of MFCC feature vectors of yDCT(l,n) ,
which offers distinct speech perceptive features for ASR process.
3.2 Adversarial MFCC Noise Generation
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As aforementioned, MFCC process is an efficient and effective
target to perturb ASR. Based on the MFCC feature vectors, we
propose a novel speech adversarial example generation algorithm,
which derives the adversarial noises from MFCC feature vectors.
3.2.1 Generation Algorithm Design
The adversarial example generation method is originally pro-
posed in [8], targeting image recognition manipulation with adver-
sarial noises in pixels. When applied to ASR, the perturbation pro-
cess shares the same methodology. As shown in the left of Fig. 4:
for any given input speech waveform x in a particular time frame,
a small adversarial noises – δ can be superposed to x in the fre-
quency domain, and an adversarial example of speech waveform
x′ is crafted. Although x′ sounds the same to human perception, it
can effectively perturb ASR results.
Adversarial Example Generation: As shown in the right of Fig. 4,
our adversarial example generation method is targeting MFCC pro-
cess, considering its small computation cost and consistency across
various ASR systems.
To further reduce the computation overhead, we choose Fast
Gradient Method (FGM) as the fundamental method to generate
the perturbation noise from MFCC feature vectors yDCT(l,n) [8].
The general FGM can be formulated as:
δ = 5J(θ,X, Y ), (7)
whereX represents the input to the target model ofM with param-
eter configuration of θ, while Y indicates the desired manipulation
results. Let f(·) represents the function of M . J is the cost func-
tion that measures the difference between f(X + δ) and Y , and5
is a partial differentiate process.
By partially differentiating the cost function J iteratively, f(X+
δ) will gradually approach to Y . When Y = f(X + δ), δ can be
considered as effective adversarial noise (or perturbation) that can
manipulate the classification result of M .
Adversarial MFCC Noise: In our proposed ASR perturbation
methods, we apply FGM to MFCC process for the adversarial MFCC
noise generation by replacing: M and θ with MFCC transforma-
tion; X with MFCC feature vectors – yDCT(l,n) ; and set Y to 0 for
maximizing the perturbation effectiveness regardless the speech con-
tent. To further fulfill Eq. 7 with MFCC, we replace yDCT(l,n) with
its calculation process through Eq. 2 to Eq. 6, which transforms a
speech waveform of xs to MFCC feature vectors:
δMFCC = 5J(θMFCC , DCT (MFB(FFT (WIN(PEM(xs)))), 0).
(8)
According to the chain rule of partial differentiation, we differ-
entiate J from Eq. 6 to Eq. 2 of MFCC process step by step. Such
a differentiation can be formulated as:
δMFCC(l,n) =DCT
′(·)·MFB′(·)·FFT ′(·)·WIN ′(·)·PEM ′(·),
( xm+δ
MFCC
(l,n) → 0 and δMFCC(l,n) < Tadv),
(9)
As the derivation value of Eq. 2 and Eq. 5 are constants, which can
be obtained directly, Eq. 9 can be further simplified as:
δMFCC(l,n) =MB(f1, f2, ..., fL)×
{
0.54−0.46cos( 2pi(n−1)
Nfra−1 )
}
×DCT ′(·)·FFT ′(·)·PEM ′(·),
( xm+δ
MFCC
(l,n) → 0 and δMFCC(l,n) < Tadv).
(10)
where δMFCC(l,n) is the generated adversarial MFCC noise that cor-
responds to each MFCC feature vector frame.
From Eq. 10, we can see that as the adversarial MFCC noise is
based on vector frame, the eventual MFCC based adversarial ex-
ample is extremely scalable. By concatenating multiple δMFCC(l,n)
together, we can acquire an adversarial example targeting arbitrary
speech length. Also, the major computation load in Eq. 10 mainly
depends on the derivation of DCT, FFT, and PEM. As these cal-
culation are well supported by state-of-the-art computing systems,
we can expect an optimal processing speed of the proposed method.
Moreover, since the generated adversarial MFCC noise is expected
to perturbing malicious ASR monitoring while maintain normal
content to normal human listeners, we also add a threshold Tadv
to regulate the generated adversarial MFCC noise from impacting
human perception quality.
3.2.2 Adversarial MFCC Example
Fig. 5 shows a case study for the effectiveness of one adversar-
ial MFCC example. From the figure we can see that, the original
speech data can be well recognized by ASR system as ”What’s your
name he asked”. However, with adversarial MFCC noise injecting
into the original speech data, the recognition results are gradually
defected, and words can’t be correctly recognized by ASR system.
Such a situation is considered as ASR perturbation, which can be
evaluated with Word Error Rate (WER).
It is important to note that, the effectiveness of the adversarial
MFCC noise is depending on the number of the computation iter-
ations at a cost of the computation time overhead. With increasing
iterations, the WER of the ASR results could be manipulated to
100%. In later sections, we will further propose relative optimiza-
tion methods and evaluations discussing the computation overhead
of the proposed method.
3.3 Optimization Regarding
Human Perception Quality
Although we regulate the noises to reduce the human perception
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Figure 5: A Case Study: Adversarial MFCC Noise Effectiveness
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impact during the adversarial MFCC noise generation, the thresh-
old based regulation still lack expected adaptability to the human
hearing, and may defect the perturbation effectiveness. In this part,
we explore the optimization scheme to enhance the proposed method
w.r.t balancing the adversarial noises and human perception quality.
3.3.1 Noise Masking Effect Analysis
The major optimization principle is to hide the adversarial noises
form the human perceptive range. Therefore, two auditory masking
effects can be well utilized to mask the adversarial noises [28]:
(1) Noise Masking with Frequency Sensitivity. As human per-
ceptible frequency ranges from 20Hz∼20kHz, significant sensitiv-
ity preference inevitably present. The hearing sensitivity threshold
is shown as the blue line in Fig. 6. We can see that the sensitive
range of hearing perception is between 200Hz to 5kHz with sound
intensity less than 30dB [29]. Based on this masking effect, more
adversarial noises should be injected to the insensitive range.
(2) Noise Masking by Adjacent Loudness. The adjacent loudness
masking means that the frequency component with higher sound
intensity may prevent its adjacent frequency component from hu-
man perception. As shown in Fig. 6, the yellow frequency com-
ponent creates a masking effect around itself. Under the masking
threshold shown as the red line, the blue frequency component can
be hardly perceived by human hearing. However, such a mask-
ing effect won’t significantly impact ASR process [28]. Hence, by
identifying the loudness in a speech waveform, more aggressive
adversarial noises can be injected around it.
3.3.2 Optimization Method Design
In this work, we integrated two principles into our adversarial
MFCC noise generation for method optimization:
According the first masking effect, we first set the threshold of
the adversarial noise generation as: Tadv ∈ {200Hz, 5kHz} in
Eq. 9. Such a regulation could effectively prevent significant ad-
versarial noise perception. However, the limited perturbation range
will led to reduced adversarial noise distribution and defect the
ASR perturbation effectiveness.
Therefore, we introduce an adversarial noise compensation scheme
following the second masking effect. For each speech waveform,
we locate the top t% frequency component with the highest sound
intensity (empirically, t≈10). Then, around those frequency com-
ponent, we further regulate the range of δMFCC(l,n) to generate con-
centrated adversarial noises.
Combining these two optimization schemes, we can effectively
enhance the adversarial MFCC noise without defecting, but im-
proving the human perception quality instead.
3.3.3 Optimization Effectiveness
Two adversarial MFCC example spectrums of are compared in
compares Fig. 7. The left one is generated with the proposed MFCC
feature-based ASR perturbation method as presented in Sec 3.2,
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while the right one is generated by the optimized method.
Comparing the two specturms, we can find several differences:
First of all, in the optimized spectrum, a clear boundary with less
frequency distribution presents around 5kHz (indicated by lighter
color change). This is caused by the frequency threshold regulation
in the optimization methods, which reduces the adversarial noises
within the human perceptible range. Moreover, we can see that
in the perceptible frequency range, some perturbation is removed,
which also reduces the adversarial noises’ impact on the manip-
ulated speech data. From the figure, we can also find some en-
hanced perturbation in certain yellow spot (indicated by brighter
color change). As the yellow spot indicates the loud frequency
component from human speech, more adversarial noises are in-
jected around this spot for better perturbation.
Therefore the spectrum differences in Fig. 7 further testifies the
effectiveness of the proposed method.
4. PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT
WITH ADAPTIVE SCHEMES
In last section, we proposed MFCC feature based ASR pertur-
bation method and further optimize it according to the human per-
ception quality. In this section, by taking the practical application
challenges into consideration, we further enhanced the proposed
method in three aspects, w.r.t environmental noise compatibility,
computation scenario adaptability, and ASR model transferability.
4.1 Environmental Noise Compatibility
In practical ASR utilization scenario (esp. with mobile devices),
the input speech waveform is usually collected with inevitable en-
vironmental noises involved. Therefore the proposed ASR pertur-
bation method requires certain environmental noise compatibility
to adapt to the practical scenarios.
When taking the environmental noises into consideration, we
formulate it as δENV – an additional component to the adversar-
ial MFCC noise. When applied δENV to Eq. 7, we can derive:
δ = 5J(θ,X + δENV , Y ), (11)
where the environmental noise actually contribute to the adversarial
MFCC noise generation as (x+ δENV + δ).
In such a case, we can well leverage the contribution of the en-
vironmental noises to reduce the adversarial noise generation load
and therefore enhance the process efficacy. Tab. 1 shows the re-
lationship between the environmental noise intensity and the com-
Table 1: Environmental Noise and Perturbation Iteration
Relationship
30 40 50 60
10 7 5 4
Noise(dB)
Iteration
5
putation iterations in terms of process efficiency. From the table
we can see that, given the same WER of 80%, with increment of
the environmental noise intensity, the iteration load of the perturbs
process is gradually relieved.
However, the environmental noise is not always positively cor-
related with the adversarial MFCC noise. When the environmen-
tal noise intensity exceed the maximum value in designated range,
Eq. 11 will become invalid. For example, when δENV + δ is larger
thanX , which means the adversarial perturbation noise overwhelm
the overall human speech.
Empirically, we tested our method in several environments with
different noise intensity, such as room, office, street, and super-
market. According to the testing, the maximum tolerance value of
environmental noise intensity is 81dB.
4.2 Computation Scenario Adaptability
Besides the environmental noises, different computation scenar-
ios also raise significant real-time requirements. As aforementioned
in Section 2.3, the proposed ASR perturbation method can be also
used as a real-time speech encryptor (e.g. a voice changer). To
prevent malicious ASR monitoring while maintaining certain user
experience quality, our proposed method also need sufficient en-
hancement to adapt real-time computation scenarios.
The major real-time issue in speech processing is the time delay.
And different mobile applications may have various delay tolerance
due to the processing mechanism and utilization scenarios. For
example, in the telephone calling scenario, where all the speech
data is required to be transmitted in real-time, the delay tolerance
is required to be less than 450ms. While, in the voice messaging
scenario, the delay tolerance is relieved to 1000ms due to expected
3rd party server processing.
When we take the adversarial MFCC noise generation into con-
sideration, the real-time delay equals to the computation time af-
ter speech. As the MFCC process is based on vector frames, the
proposed method has naturally optimal scalability. When the real-
time requirement has extremely small delay tolerance, the adver-
sarial MFCC noise generation can be reconfigured with smaller
or discrete vector frames to reduce the computation time for each
iteration. So with small perturbation effectiveness compromised,
the proposed method can still catch up the real-time speech pro-
cess. Meanwhile for high time delay tolerance, we can extend the
vector frame scale even to a whole sentence. With more compre-
hensive information and computation time, the adversarial MFCC
noise generation can offer significant perturbation effectiveness.
Considering different delay time tolerance, we test our proposed
method on 500 audio samples from Common Voice Dataset [30]
and Fig. 8 depicts the relationship between iteration, computation
time and WER. During the test, adversarial MFCC noise generation
method produce adversarial MFCC noise on each 200ms length
speech data. In the figure, it clearly shows that with the compu-
tation time increase, the WER will also get a higher value.
4.3 ASR Model Transferability
As the proposed method is for preventing malicious ASR mon-
itoring. The generated adversarial MFCC noise is expected to en-
counter different ASR models. Therefore the model transferability
is most critical key of actual utilization.
As aforementioned in Section 2, the MFCC process is consis-
tently adopted as the very first feature extraction stage in various
ASR system. Meanwhile MFCC feature vectors feed all the other
models in a ASR system. Therefore, MFCC process lays the most
primary and intrinsic feature foundation for ASR process. In such
a case, manipulation on the MFCC feature vectors has the natural
advantages of model transferability. To enhance the transferability
of the proposed methods, we only apply the MFCC feature based
ASR perturbation method only on the standard MFCC process for
adversarial MFCC noise generation in ASR regardless other addi-
tional models. In later sections, we will further evaluate the ASR
model transferability of the proposed method.
5. SPEECHSECURITYSOLUTIONOFHASP
Based on the works in previous sections, we proposed HASP –
an adaptive mobile speech security enhancement solution. The pri-
mary method of HASP applies the adversarial example generation
methodology to the most fundamental ASR feature extraction stage
of MFCC. The generated adversarial MFCC noises are injected to
speech data for perturbing malicious ASR monitoring. Based on
this fundamental method, we also investigated one intrinsic algo-
rithm optimization targeting improving adversarial MFCC noise’s
human perception quality, as well as three external capability en-
hancement schemes regarding environmental noise compatibility,
computation scenario adaptability, and model transferability. To
achieve HASP effectively, especially for mobile systems, where are
the hot-spot for malicious ASR monitoring, we further discussed
the preliminary implementation for it.
To apply HASP to practical utilization, especially the mobile de-
vices, where malicious ASR monitoring prevails, we further imple-
mente HASP on Android smartphones. To implement the HASP in
an Android system, we experienced the following major stages:
1. We first used a state-of-the-art smartphone, Google Nexus 5,
as our experiment hardware platform.
2. We extracted a standard MFCC model from theDeepSpeech [12]
and modified the MFCC model to support differentiation operation
on each stage.
3. We deployed the MFCC feature based adversarial example
generation process with Tensorflow library [31], and patched the
generation process to be light-weight processing engine.
4. We integrated the native Android DCT and FFT tools in the
kernel support the adversarial MFCC noise generation for faster
processing speed.
6. We explored the Android kernel programming to the devolve
the audio process thread and deployed HASP as a middle-ware in
the mobile audio processing system.
7. We also optimized the Android system threats management
which can make sure the HASP can get more system resource after
collecting the speech data.
Based on these steps, HASP can be well-deployed on the state-
of-the-art smartphones with optimal processing performance. In
the next section, we will further evaluate HASP.
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6. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
In previous sections, through the design and verification ofHASP,
we have achieved preliminary evaluation of the certain HASP per-
formance. For example, the speech quality oriented optimization of
HASP can further reduce the human-perceptible adversarial noises
by 42%, and be well deployed with environmental noises as loud
as 81db. Therefore in this section, we will mainly focus several
major performance perspectives, namely the computation perfor-
mance, perturbation successful rate in terms of WER, as well as
ASR model transferability.
In the first experiment, we evaluate the computation performance
and perturbation rate by comparing HASP to the state-of-art speech
manipulation work proposed [9]. [9] also utilized the similar ad-
versarial example approach to manipulate the ASR results. Dif-
ferent from HASP, [9] applied the adversarial examples mainly
to the CTC model as shown in Fig. 1. During the comparison, we
adopted audio samples from Common Voice as our dataset [30] and
use DeepSpeech [12] as the perturbation targeted malicious moni-
toring ASR model.
In the second experiment, we also evaluate HASP regarding its
model transferability. And multiple commercialized ASR models
are also included as malicious monitoring ASR models. Please
note that, most of these models are not open-sourced, so this model
transferability test also demonstrates HASP’s performance on the
so-called “black-box” ASR models.
6.1 HASP Performance Evaluation
We first compare the performance between the fundamental method
ofHASP, namely the MFCC feature based ASR perturbation method
(refer as ”HASP”), and the state-of-the-art method proposed in [9]
(refered as ”CTC”). As both methods are based on adversarial
noise generation, we also introduced random noises as the evalu-
ation baseline (referred as “Noise”).
Tab. 2 shows the comparison results between HASP, CTC and
Noise in respect of WER and computation time. For performance
comparison, all the three methods are executed on a computer server
to generate adversarial examples over speech data of 1000mm.
(1) The left part of Tab. 2 evaluates the perturbation performance
by comparing the WER achieved by certain amount of iteration.
With the same iteration number increment from 1 to 10, HASP
could achieve a WER ranging from 56.5% to 84.6%, and CTC
achieves 36.0% to 77.1%, while random Noise could also cause
certain WER with a rate round 30%. Comparing HASP to CTC, we
can see that, HASP overperforms CTC in every iteration stage.
(2) The right part of Tab. 2 evaluates the computation time per-
formance with certain iteration number. From the table we can see
that from 1∼10 iterations, the time consumed by HASP is main-
tained around 100s. Meanwhile, CTC suffers from significant time
consumption from 1120ms to 3155ms. In such a case, HASP ’s
processing speed is 15×∼ 40× faster then the state-of-art method.
From this comparison we can see that by deriving the adversarial
noises from MFCC feature, we can achieve outstanding efficiency
and effectiveness for perturbing malicious ASR process. More-
over, for practical ASR perturbation, HASP could averagely finish
10 iteration cycles regarding real-time requirement and achieve an
average WER of 84.5%.
As aforementioned, we also implemented HSAP on the Android
smartphone. Fig. 9 illustrates the WER and computation time of
HSAP. When deployed on Nexus 5, The adversarial example can
be effectively generated for every 200ms of speech data. Regarding
the computation time, the time overhead for the first iteration is
around 302ms. After that, the average computation cost for each
iteration is 42ms.
Table 2: WER and Computation Time Performance Comparison
on Desktop
1 56.5% 36.0% 21.1%
2 63.1% 45.1% 24.6%
3 67.5% 53.4% 26.9%
4 72.4% 59.97% 28.3%
5 75.8% 65.0% 28.9%
6 78.6% 68.6% 31.1%
7 80.0% 71.7% 32.2%
8 81.8% 73.4% 33.0%
9 83.2% 75.9% 33.3%
10 84.6% 77.1% 33.6%
CTC
1 104.2 1120 203
2 108.1 1332 206
3 112.9 1562 211
4 116.5 1786 215
5 120.3 2017 218
6 124.8 2243 223
7 128.9 2471 227
8 133.3 2690 232
9 136.9 2924 239
10 140.8 3155 243
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Figure 9: HASP Performance Evaluation on Nexus 5
6.2 Model Transferability of HASP
In first experiment, we use DeepSpeech as our perturbation ASR
system. In this experiment, we try to prove that our proposed secu-
rity enhancement solution has strong transferability that can also
perturb other ASR platforms. We choose 6 the state-of-the-art
speech recognition platforms: Google Voice, Sphinx, Wit.ai, Mi-
crosoft, Houndify and IBM and then generate 500 adversarial ex-
amples which are manipulated by HSAP and CTC method respec-
tively. Next, we feed these adversarial example audios to 6 ASR
systems. Also, in order to make further comparison, we feed 500
original audio examples to the 6 ASR system. Fig. 10 illustrates
the experiment result:
In figure, it clearly shows that HSAP can always achieve high-
est WER performance among 6 ASR systems when compared to
the CTC perturbed audio and original audio. For HSAP, the high-
est WER value is 77.8% and obtained when perturb to the Sphinx
while the lowest WER value is 51% and obtained when perturb to
the Google Voice. Although testing on Google Voice get the lowest
perturbation performance, the WER is more than 50% which still
can protect the speech data from the ASR system. On the other
hand, the highest WER which achieved by CTC is 51% while its
lowest WER is 16.3%. Hence, the experiment result can highly
prove that MFCC feature has intrinsic character and universal ef-
fectiveness to the all ASR systems and our approach have strong
ASR model transferability.
7. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed HASP – a high-performance adap-
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tive mobile security enhancement solution targeting malicious ASR
monitoring on mobile devices. Based on injecting adversarial noises
to MFCC feature vectors in ASR, HASP achieved outstanding per-
formance in perturbing malicious ASR monitoring, with an average
WER of 84.5% and 15×∼40× faster processing speed compar-
ing to the state-of-the-art method. HASP also had high robustness
to external noises and application-oriented computation scenarios.
Moreover, HASP demonstrated optimal perturbation transferability
to different ASR systems. Therefore HASP can be well deployed on
mobile devices and meet practical usage requirements. Through the
design and implementation of HASP, we prove that various ASR
systems share significant similarity in low level feature extraction
process.
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